Thinking about Threats
Many steps to improve security can be taken at various stages of software development. However, an important place to begin is with a dedicated analysis of potential threats. Without a sound understanding of the possible threats against a given system, it's unlikely that developers will be able to adequately defend against them. 6 Surprisingly, this step is often performed hastily or skipped. One problem is that developers often assume they understand all common attack patterns and therefore fail to explore each system's speci c vulnerabilities. Alternatively, they might assume they can patch in security later in the design by following accepted security policies and procedures.
To some extent, each system is unique. Even supposing that the system components are well understood and previously have been composed in the same way, the ways a deployed system is used, misused, or reappropriated can introduce unanticipated security vulnerabilities. Building a secure system requires proactive, rigorous analysis of the threats to which it might be exposed, followed by systematic transformation of those threats into security-related requirements. These requirements can then be tracked throughout the development life cycle.
Threat modeling aims to
• identify attackers' potential abilities and goals and • catalog possible threats that the system must be designed to mitigate.
We consider threat modeling a requirements activity. The most bene t comes from understanding what security requirements are needed and
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Jane Cleland-Huang, Tamara Denning, Tadayoshi Kohno, Forrest Shull, and Samuel Weber using those requirements to drive architecture decisions, develop test strategies, and engage in other software development activities. However, in reality, threatmodeling techniques vary and can be applied to both existing and greenfield systems; different techniques are more suited to different software development activities and different development domains. Some techniques are like checklists, enumerating possible threats developers should consider in the context of their system. Others are less deterministic and try to inject more creativity to stimulate thinking about unusual attack vectors. All techniques encourage developers to think more critically about their system and about ways to subvert it; this contrasts with the more usual approaches that focus on functionality. As you might expect, developers find it exceptionally difficult to be complete and consistent and to truly put themselves in the shoes of an attacker.
Security Cards: A Threat Brainstorming Toolkit
To assist threat analysis, Tamara Denning, Batya Friedman, and Tadayoshi Kohno developed the Security Cards. 7 The Security Cards consist of 42 cards divided into four categories, or dimensions: Human Impact, Adversary's Motivations, Adversary's Resources, and Adversary's Methods.
Here, we illustrate how the cards might serve as starting points to explore potential threats to a technological system-in this case, an ICD. This thought exercise is only to explore what these software development processes would look like when applied to a system concept. We don't intend to make statements regarding current ICD security or what security considerations have been incorporated into the development process.
Human Impact
This dimension explores how security breaches could affect humans. The impacts range from personalprivacy violations to widespread societal impact. Threat-modeling sessions could start by ranking the Human Impact cards according to their relevance to the system under consideration. In this case, a highly relevant card is the Physical Wellbeing card (the first card in Figure  1 ). It asks us to think about how a misused or compromised ICD could impact people's physical well-being. However, we could also consider cards such as Emotional Wellbeing (for example, patients are aware of the threat to their health), Financial Wellbeing or Relationships (for example, the attack aims to discredit the ICD company), or Personal Data (for example, the attacker wants to use the identifying personal data stored on the device).
Adversary's Motivations
This dimension explores why someone might want to attack a system. It helps provide a framework to explore a potential attack's scope and intended targets. For example, the Malice or Revenge card (the second card in Figure 1 ) might lead us to consider the situation in which an adversary attacks the ICD user owing to extreme emotion. Other motivation-related cards could include Self-Promotion (for example, the attacker wants to demonstrate technical prowess) or Diplomacy or Warfare (for example, the attacker aims to take down a political enemy who happens to have an ICD). Considering potential adversaries' motivations helps determine what resources they might have and helps us construct attacker pro les.
Adversary's Resources
This dimension explores assets an adversary might use to launch an attack. These include hardware and software tools, technical expertise, and various forms of inuence. In this case, we select the Expertise card (the third card in Figure 1 ) and consider the hacker's potential technical skills. Another relevant card could be A Future World, which considers potential future attacks, given that interest exists in increasing the capabilities of remote checkups. We might also consider Impunity (for example, the attack might be dif cult to pin on a particular person or to prosecute) or Inside Knowledge (for example, a former employee uses detailed, proprietary knowledge about the architecture).
Adversary's Methods
This dimension explores how an adversary might attack the system, including technology, coercion, and abusing logistical and bureaucratic processes. We might select the Technological Attack card (the fourth card in Figure 1 ), given that researchers have previously demonstrated such attacks. We also could consider cards such as Multi-Phase Attack (for example, the adversary tampers with software in the doctor's of ce responsible for sending commands to the ICD), Indirect Attack, or Attack Cover-up.
From Threats to Requirements
Exhaustively cataloging threats is of limited use if we don't use the information to improve the software we're developing. To illustrate moving from threats to requirements, suppose our threat model contains the following threat, written from a malicious user's perspective: "As an IT specialist with intent to physically harm an ICD patient, I'll launch an attack on the device that will change the intended effects on the patient's heart."
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Adversary's Methods
The ICD is life-supporting. Modifying its functionality could cause a patient's death.
If a nefarious person became embroiled in a dispute with an ICD user, he or she could attempt to leverage the ICD to harm its user.
The attacker might have a graduate degree in IT and the skills to hack into the ICD.
Tamper with the ICD. Change the therapy settings to harm the patient's health. We need to identify and specify requirements that prevent this adversary from achieving this goal. The rst step is to identify vulnerabilities that enable each speci c threat. Figure 2 illustrates this through a partial analysis of vulnerabilities and issues that might facilitate an attack on an ICD. The ICD is vulnerable if it lacks an authentication mechanism or the adversary acquires authentication by stealing login information or eavesdropping. To execute the attack, the adversary must successfully transmit a valid command to the ICD. For the attack to succeed, the ICD patient should either be unaware of the attack and therefore unable to take remedial action (such as moving out of transmission range) or be immediately incapacitated.
We then analyze the associated vulnerabilities, evaluate possible mitigations, and specify them as candidate requirements. The scenario in which the ICD has no authentication mechanism is a potential problem for embedded medical devices, in which power consumption is crucial. To address this problem, we consider specifying the requirement, "ICD commands will be accepted only from veri ed controllers." To address the scenario in which the attacker acquires authentication, we consider specifying the requirement, "All data transmitted to the ICD must be encrypted." However, we must carefully examine both requirements and balance them against the need for additional processing, which would drain battery life. Furthermore, decreased accessibility could inhibit access to the ICD in an emergency.
So, we might consider an alternate requirement. In lieu of limiting access to veri ed controllers and encrypting data, a next-best option might be to provide an audible warning to ICD patients each time the device starts communicating with a controller. Such a requirement would clearly be a tradeoff. It's unlikely to provide suf cient security in the face of Barnaby Jack's shock attack, for example, but it might partially protect the user from privacy invasions or unauthorized recon gurations.
AND OR
The ICD accepts commands from an unauthorized external program.
OR
The adversary transmits a message to the ICD.
WEAK OR
The ICD patient doesn't or can't mitigate the attack.
The ICD has no authentication mechanism.
The ICD supports authentication, but the adversary acquires authentication info.
ICD commands will only be accepted from veri ed controllers.
The ICD accepts unencrypted data.
The ICD only accepts encrypted data, but the adversary knows the encryption key.
All data transmitted to the ICD must be encrypted.
The ICD patient is unaware of data transmission.
The ICD patient will be noti ed each time data is transmitted.
The ICD patient is aware of data transmission but takes no remedial actions.
The ICD patient is incapacitated by the attack.
As an IT specialist with intent to physically harm an ICD patient, I'll launch an attack on the device that will change the intended effects on the patient's heart.
FIGURE 2.
A threat tree models system vulnerabilities that potentially enable the threat-in this case, an attack on an ICD. Additional vulnerabilities could exist that the gure doesn't show.
Maintaining Traceability
Security requirements are driven by the threat-modeling process but are ultimately constrained by hardware and software tradeoffs. However, being able to maintain traceability from speci c requirements back to the threats they address will likely be useful as tradeoffs among requirements are negotiated. It's important to ensure that some mitigation for important threats is maintained, even if the form of that mitigation needs to adapt and evolve. Luckily, most of us don't have to build systems that must resist attacks by determined nations and whose failure would cause people to die. Attempting to provide perfect security for such systems not only isn't necessary but also almost certainly wouldn't be cost effective. Another bene t of threat modeling (and according to some people, the primary bene t) is documenting what threats won't be mitigated.
Without a documented, consistent understanding of what threats are out of scope, systems typically end up with extremely poor security. For example, many stories exist of systems whose password reset functionalities totally undermined all the other security features. After all, an attacker only needs to target the weakest point in a system's defenses. As another example, many organizations decide that it's not worth building technical solutions to counter insider attacks (employees deliberately doing malicious actions to their employer's systems). However, without explicitly documenting this decision, it's all too easy to overlook that the system must be built so that after employees have been red, their knowledge of system passwords and procedures can't be used against their ex-employer.
I
n the end, we all agree that security requirements are needed. However, writing them without engaging in threat modeling will likely lead to cookie-cutter requirements that capture the same old problems. We will probably remember to include standard security functions, although we might not remember to specify them in the requirements document. It's less likely we'll think about speci c threats that might be unique to our system. So, threat modeling is an essential activity that should form a natural prelude to the requirements process.
